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Lara v. State, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 20, 87 P.3d 528 (2004)1
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – POST-CONVICTION RELIEF – HABEAS
CORPUS
Summary
Appeal from a district court order denying a post-conviction petition for a write of habeas
corpus.2
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed. A petition for habeas corpus relief is appropriately denied when defendant’s
attorneys provided effective assistance at all stages of trial.
Factual and Procedural History
On April 10, 1997, the State charged appellant Jerry Lara with use of a deadly weapon
(open murder) and discharging a firearm into a vehicle, stemming from an October 26, 1996
incident. The State alleged that Lara fired several shots at the rear of Eduardo Sonera’s 1976
Cadillac and that one of the bullets hit and killed Alex Arroyo, a child passenger. At trial, the
State theorized that eyewitnesses’ inconsistent statements were related to Lara’s alleged
membership in the “18th Street Gang.”
A jury found Lara guilty on all charges. Lara subsequently filed a motion for a new trial,
which the district court denied. Lara received a life sentence with the possibility of parole after a
minimum 20 years on the murder conviction, an equal and consecutive sentence for the deadly
weapon enhancement, and a concurrent 16 to 72 month sentence for discharge of a firearm. Lara
was also ordered to pay $3,843.55 in restitution and received credit for 353 days served in local
custody. The supreme court dismissed his direct appeal.
Lara then filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Lara claimed
prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. The district court properly denied the prosecutorial misconduct claim for
procedural reasons.3
Lara appealed the order, arguing that the district court erred in denying the ineffective
counsel claims. Lara claimed that trial counsel failed to object to evidence of, and examine
witnesses concerning Lara’s alleged gang involvement; failed to object to or address evidence
that witnesses gave inaccurate information for fear of retaliation; presenting gang evidence as
part of the defense case; giving inadequate advice on whether Lara should testify; and failing to
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properly examine Lara. Lara further claimed that appellate counsel failed to raise claims of error
in connection with the admission of evidence of gang membership and fear of retaliation at trial.
Discussion
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
The question of whether a defendant has received ineffective counsel is a mixed question
of both fact and law and is, therefore, subject to appellate review.4 The district court’s factual
findings are entitled to deference upon review.5
Using the Strickland v. Washington6 factors, a defendant must establish two factors to
prevail on a claim of ineffective counsel at trial. First, the counsel must have provided deficient
performance. Second, the deficient performance must have prejudiced the defense. To establish
deficient performance, the defendant must show that the counsel’s performance fell below and
objective standard of reasonableness. To establish prejudice, the defendant must show a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different, but for the
counsel’s errors. Trial counsel’s strategy and tactics are “virtually unchallengeable absent
extraordinary circumstances.”7
Lara first contended that his trial attorney was ineffective because he failed to object to
gang-affiliation evidence, inadequately cross-examined State witnesses, and called a defense
witness who revealed Lara was in a gang.
Gang affiliation evidence may be relevant and is not substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice when it proves motive.8 The State properly offered evidence of gang affiliation as a
motive for the shooting and to explain the bias or fear of witnesses. Defense counsel also had to
reveal Lara’s gang affiliation to impeach State witnesses and support Lara’s alibi defense.
During the post-conviction hearing, Lara’s trial counsel stated that he questioned the jury
regarding gang-related issues because the jury would know of Lara’s gang affiliation due to his
tattoos and the nature of the case. Further, trial counsel testified that he had to reveal Lara’s
gang affiliation to exploit inconsistencies and deficiencies in the State’s evidence.
The supreme court concluded that the gang-related evidence was probative as to motive.
The court also concluded that it was reasonable for trial counsel to conclude that disclosure of
Lara’s gang affiliation was critical to establish the alibi and impeach State witnesses. Because
trial counsel could not properly defend the case without addressing the gang issue, Lara did not
establish that his counsel was ineffective at trial. Therefore, Lara did not satisfy the first prong
of the Strickland test.9
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Further to Lara’s contention that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel advised
Lara to testify at trial, the supreme court concluded that counsel properly advised Lara of his
right to testify or not testify. An accused makes the fundamental decisions regarding the case,
including the decision whether to testify.10
Lara also contended that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to
the introduction of evidence that witnesses gave inconsistent statements out of fear of
retaliation.11 Because trial counsel objected to some of this testimony, and later impeached
witnesses on cross-examination, the failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance.
Trial counsel used tactical and strategic decisions during the examinations of witnesses.
Therefore, neither Strickland factor was satisfied.
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
Lara next argued that he received ineffective assistance from appellate counsel because
counsel failed to argue prosecutorial misconduct and that the district court erred in not screening
the gang-related evidence in a Petrocelli hearing.
The right the effective counsel extends to a direct appeal.12 The Strickland test is also
used to review a claim of ineffective appellate counsel. “To establish prejudice based on the
deficient assistance of appellate counsel, the defendant must show that the omitted issue would
have a reasonable probability of success on appeal.”13
Lara’s appellate counsel had prosecuted more than 100 criminal appeals, and after a full
assessment of the case, chose to focus on the denial of Lara’s motion for a new trial. Appellate
counsel need not raise every non-frivolous issue to provide effective assistance. Since the
district court properly admitted the gang-related evidence, any appeal of those issues would have
been fruitless.
Conclusion
Counsel can differ as to the best strategical and tactical decisions in defending a criminal
defendant without providing ineffective assistance.
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